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FACILITATING FORENSICS IN THE MOBILE 
MILLENNIUM THROUGH PROACTIVE ENTERPRISE 
SECURITY  
Andrew R. Scholnick 
SNVC LC 
ABSTRACT 
This work explores the impact of the emerging mobile communication device paradigm on the 
security-conscious enterprise, with regard to providing insights for proactive Information Assurance 
and facilitation of eventual Forensic analysis.  Attention is given to technology evolution in the areas 
of best practices, attack vectors, software and hardware performance, access and activity monitoring, 
and architectural models.  
Keywords: Forensics, enterprise security, mobile communication, best practices, attack vectors. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The exploding popularity of smartphone technology has greatly outpaced related advancements in the 
area of information security.  Exacerbating this problem is the fact that few organizations properly 
understand the new contexts in which security is (and is not) an applicable concern.  As a result, many 
enterprises that should be concerned about the security posture of their smartphone device users are, in 
actuality, unknowingly at risk of being compromised.  These evolutionary changes regarding 
communications technology have precipitated a need to rethink both the interrelationships and the 
distinguishing factors influencing information security in enterprise voice and data infrastructure.   
With ever-expanding functional capabilities and the ever increasing nuances they impose on 
information security models, a new way of thinking about enterprise security is needed.  At a time 
when many traditional enterprise infrastructures are only now acclimating to models integrating 
internet presence and/or VOIP capabilities, and while they are still reeling to accommodate the 
emergence of social media concerns, the new breed of mobile devices which have emerged since the 
introduction of the iPhone and the iPad have shattered old paradigms for data protection by 
introducing entirely new methods for transporting and accessing data and data networks. 
Paramount within the discussion of how data security issues have been impacted by these evolving 
technologies is an understanding of the significant paradigm shifts which are emerging in the digital 
and communications worlds.  The still-embryonic emergence of personally-focused digital mobility, 
which is itself an outgrowth of changes in wireless communications capabilities, has triggered a fast 
and furious stream of innovations which are continuing to revolutionize how people think about their 
personal manner of interaction with all aspects digital technology, especially with regard to 
professional assets available from their employer’s enterprise environments.  Overall, the confusion 
surrounding rapid evolution in any technology arena often results in draconian posturing from the 
enterprise security community until such time as things become more ‘sorted out’1.  This document 
attempts to identify the current primary areas of confusion surrounding secure adoption of mobile 
technology, and examines the impact of the current paradigm shifts on the enterprise by evaluating the 
security of both the underlying communications technologies in play and the resulting changes in 
access technologies being built to exploit their evolving capabilities.  Working within the context of 
this paradigm shift, information assurance and enterprise security issues are considered and problems 
regarding the enablement of better and more informative forensic tools are discussed. 
                                                 
1 Gallagher, Sean (2012), “Why the next ‘ObamaBerry’ might run Android or iOS”, 
http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2011/11/will-the-next-obamaberry-be-a-nexus-or-an-ipad.ars,  28-JAN-2012 
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2. THE NEW PARADIGM 
“What does it do?”  This is a question which has probably greeted major advancements in technology 
since the invention of the wheel.  The answers to this question can have profound implications in the 
realm of security.  Nowhere is this truer than with the introduction of mobile phones into the enterprise 
environment.  When first introduced, for example, one might have reasonably surmised that these 
devices were ‘just wireless phones’.  As the technology evolved however, they quickly incorporated 
the basic functionality of pagers – an advance which has further evolved into the Simple Message 
Service (SMS) text messaging capability prevalent today.  Further evolution of the devices allowed for 
the incorporation of cameras, geo-location technology, and practical computer-equivalent 
functionality.  This evolutionary metamorphosis has introduced powerful technological changes which 
represent a considerable shift in the overall security posture of the mobile phone.   
What was once a simple voice communication tool is now a powerful ‘Swiss army knife’ offering a 
wealth of ever increasing capabilities
2
 with an ever broadening spectrum of potential points of 
compromise.  In short, a potential nightmare for any organization concerned with information security.  
Unfortunately, the technological changes have been so pervasive, and adoption of the resulting 
computer powered multifunction portable communication technology (better known as ‘smartphone’ 
or ‘smart device’ technology) has occurred so rapidly, that accurate and appropriate identification of 
potential security risks has not kept up, resulting in a growing concern for impending crisis
3
. 
2.1 An Evolutionary Shift 
Key to understanding the shift in paradigms is a need to appreciate the factors driving modern-day 
technological change.  Today’s workforce has learned that it is possible to have access to high quality 
business resources regardless of where they are, when they want it, or what type of device (desktop, 
laptop, tablet, or smartphone) they wish to use.  Arguably, there are three primary categories of end-
user demands which are contributing to the still-evolving technology solutions coming into 
prominence: 
 Simplicity – easy to use, well integrated, interoperable 
 Performance – high speed, full color, real time  
 Comfort – safe to use, feels good, easy to access 
The breakthroughs in communications technology represented by the new breed of mobile devices 
have fueled a headlong charge by innovators striving to create newer and better resources for a 
ravenous market.  Resulting from this explosion of creative energy is a multifaceted shift in access 




2.1.1 User Perception 
At the heart of many current enterprise security problems is the rapidly emerging shift in social 
attitudes towards digital communication capabilities.  Succinctly, the user community knows it is now 
possible to integrate everything needed for doing business into a single device they can carry with 
them at all times, and they want that greater flexibility and lower cost capability now.  When 
combined with the rapidly changing technological environment, this ‘I want it now’ attitude 
                                                 
2 Fei, Liang, (2012), “Mobile app market set for increased growth”, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/692610/Mobile-app-market-set-for-increased-growth-Gartner.aspx, 29-JAN-
2012 
3 Thierer, Adam (2012), ‘Prophecies of Doom & the Politics of Fear in Cybersecurity Debates’, 
http://techliberation.com/2011/08/08/prophecies-of-doom-the-politics-of-fear-in-cybersecurity-debates/, 28-JAN-2012 
4 Simple Security (2012), “Mobile security market in for exponential growth”, 
http://www.simplysecurity.com/2011/09/30/mobile-security-market-in-for-exponential-growth/, 31-JAN-2012 
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encourages potentially disastrous snap judgment decision-making which can result in impractical 
security models based on outmoded demand, usage, management, and maintenance models.  Thus, the 
shifts in underlying communications technologies influencing this attitudinal progression embody 
many of the primary factors to consider when defining an appropriate way forward. 
2.1.2 Tools and Resources 
For most people, the dynamic shift in the function, performance, and scope of communication tools 
which is currently being experienced, can be summed up in two catch-phrases: social media and cloud 
computing.  These two areas of influence dovetail beautifully with the perpetual enterprise-
organization search to enhance collaboration and standardize capabilities.  Therein lays the problem…  
Powerful new technologies have already become ubiquitous for private use, and the modern worker is 
demanding that they be allowed as business resources too.  Powerful new search engines make it easy 
to find data; but in most workplaces the user is still tied to the old-fashioned relational database.  
Amazing and versatile collaboration environments are popping up all over the internet facilitating 
geographically agnostic coordination and transfer of data among friends, classmates, families, job 
seekers, and gossips; yet the average team leader must continue to ‘make do’ with email (if lucky, 
with remote access), voicemail, conference rooms, and, where available, occasional access to a VPN 
connection or video conference.  Yet talk of new file sharing and desktop virtualization services 
abound in the media, and 4G ‘hotspots’ are advertised at the local coffee shop.  Meanwhile, at present, 
few or none of these innovative tools and resources is provided to the workforce effectively by their 
employment enterprise. 
2.1.3 Boundary Changes 
Who would have believed back in 2000 that security professionals in 2012 would look back at them, 
nostalgically thinking about how much simpler things were?  What once were clearly defined borders 
for wire-line digital access and data-centric information security have morphed into a world of 
network-integrated real-time video feeds, geolocation, universal access, and terabyte pocket-drives.  
The combination of high-volume portability, target tracking, and unsecured endpoints has obsoleteed 
many formerly effective best practices, virtually overnight.  Because of these changes, information 
believed to be well protected by firewalls and access controls is being found, with increasing 
frequency, to be exposed in previously unanticipated ways. 
3. CONCERNS OF THE ENTERPRISE 
Yesterday’s designs for tomorrow’s solutions must be rewritten today.  Sufficient information exists to 
predict where infrastructure needs and technological capabilities are headed.  Technology plans 
derived based on goals statements established prior to 2010 should be considered suspect and 
reviewed for necessary course-correction.  Any such goals and plans derived prior to 2007 should be 
reassessed with even greater prejudice.  Why?  Two words – iPhone (introduced in 2007) and iPad 
(introduced in 2010).  The introduction of these devices has revolutionized the way in which society 
views everything in both the personal and business communications realms.  The explosive emergence 
of corresponding open source (Google Android) and proprietary (RIM Blackberry PlayBook) 
commercially viable technology in the same arena require a reassessment of the very meaning behind 
a concept like Enterprise Security.  These new tools have redefined the framework upon which future-
facing productive work environments must be built.  By analyzing the nature of these changes it 
becomes possible to implement integrated proactive and reactive tools and architectures focused on 
affordably and effectively protecting the enterprise. 
3.1 Problem Definition 
Within today’s multifaceted communications technology framework it has become necessary for 
security professionals to identify logical areas for conceptual delineation and use them to define 
appropriate methods for segmenting the overall security problem into more manageable pieces.  This 
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section will identify three major areas of concern, and provide a high-level perspective for why they 
are applicable to protecting the enterprise environment.   
3.1.1 Technology Trends 
Perhaps the most significant advancements in technology impacting the integration of mobile device 
use with enterprise security models are the advent of both deployed 4G cellular networks, which offer 
access to greater bandwidth, and cool-running quad-core CPU technology
5
 for use at the heart of 
mobile devices.  These advances present a ‘good news / bad news’ dichotomy to enterprise security 
professionals.  The bad news is that we can now expect to see more sophisticated and powerful attacks 
against and through mobile devices (thanks to the CPU enhancements), and more damaging 
exfiltrations capitalizing on the higher bandwidth.  The good news is that more complex and effective 
defenses are now possible, thanks also to the CPU and bandwidth enhancements. 
3.1.2 Device Vulnerability 
From an enterprise security standpoint, the most noteworthy threats represented by mobile devices 
stem from three primary attack vectors: eavesdropping, infection, and theft.  All three of these risks are 
magnified by the lack of sufficient protection on mobile devices both through their operating systems 
and the applications they run.  Insufficient security-focused device management and control options 
distress any enterprise operations team attempting to implement acceptable mobile device 
management (MDM) solutions while ineffective application marketplace quality controls facilitate 
unsuspecting installation of apps containing malware.  Added to the already challenging problems 
presented by browser exploitations and popular document viewer and other third-party tool 
vulnerabilities
6
, the intricate problem of mitigating mobile device vulnerabilities can seem daunting. 
3.1.3 Infrastructure Vulnerability 
Depending upon specifics of the enterprise architecture, additional aspects of two attack vectors, 
eavesdropping and infection, may exist.  Again, the problem stems from insufficient security-focused 
device management and control options available in device operating systems and resulting failures 
presented by the diversity of MDM solutions currently available. 
3.2 Understanding Protection Issues 
The primary issues regarding protection of enterprise environments without impeding use of mobile 
technology result from the intersection of two questions: what type of access does the user need (the 
access model) and what will happen to the data being accessed (the usage model).  By understanding 
the answers to these questions, many of the necessary steps for providing effectual mitigations and for 
facilitating development and implementation of responsive and dynamic forensics tools become self-
evident.  With this information in hand it is subsequently possible to define effective and 
comprehensive security architectures for the modern enterprise. 
3.2.1 Access Models 
As identified earlier in this work, recent advances in technology are fueling the already explosive 
evolution and adoption of mobile technologies in ways that are significantly impacting worker 
perspectives and expectations.  Consider, for example, that less than a decade ago the VPN was 
generally considered to be an enterprise-level tool.  Utilizing them to provide personal access into an 
enterprise environment was deemed inappropriate for the vast majority of individual workers.  In fact, 
few workers actually requested such capabilities from their employers because the tools and network 
                                                 
5 Purewal, Sarah Jacobsson (2012), “Nvidia Quad Core Mobile Processors Coming in August”, 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/219768/nvidia_quad_core_mobile_processors_coming_in_august.html, 30-JAN-2012 
6
 Quirolgico, Steve, Voas, Jeffrey and Kuhn, Rick (2011), “Vetting Mobile Apps”, Published by the 
IEEE Computer Society, JUL/AUG 2011 
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connectivity required to properly utilize such access were prohibitively expensive.  Even when costs 
were not a major factor and where the enterprise environment supported such access, the personal 
equipment and home connectivity used to exploit such access was often ponderously slow, rendering it 
undesirable to many.  In light of existing technology improvements, as well as looming exponential 
performance leaps, this entire paradigm has become invalid.   
Within the same span of time, technologies have emerged which allow an attacker to target resources 
that were previously seen as well-protected.  Email servers, customer service portals, limited access 
kiosks, and other common tools and utilities have been, and continue to be, successfully compromised 
by direct and indirect attack.  Similarly, techniques believed sufficient to protect the data flowing to an 
endpoint believed to be secure have proven to be just as lacking in veracity. Successful attacks against 
cryptographic keys, security and authentication certificates, and even the protocols that utilize them 
have been repeatedly in the news and recounted at numerous technical conferences.  Introduction of 
mobile device capabilities require that formerly improbable attack vectors be reevaluated and 
mitigations and protections identified for use.  
It should also be noted that the primary access models discussed below are generally used in 
combination, to provide a form of defense-in-depth, by layering the overall security model.  Thus, 
while requiring a password for user authentication provides a degree of protection, collecting the 
password from the user through an encrypted envelope (like an SSL tunnel) is even better.  In fact, 
encrypting the password before passing it through the tunnel can enhance protection of the 
authentication credential even further.  
3.2.1.1 Authentication 
Arguably the oldest and most prominent access model used for computer security is password 
authentication, where a secret is held by the user and shared with a system or application to gain 
access.  While more complex authenticators have evolved over the years (such as time-sensitive and 
out-of-band tokens, biometric sensors, physical authentication credentials, and digital certificates), the 
basic principle of this access model is that users must authenticate themselves to the system using 
theoretically unimpeachable credentials such as one or more shared secret and/or dynamic 
authenticators.  The degree of geographic independence obtainable though introduction of mobile 
technology to enterprise environments can severely upset the dependability of many, previously 
trusted authenticators.  Biometrics, for example, is virtually useless as a remote authenticator since the 
assurance they provide as an authenticator is tied to physical presence.  A security model that 
considers accepting them remotely risks introduction of attack possibilities based on credential 
counterfeiting and hijacking which would otherwise have been improbable or impossible within an 
enterprise infrastructure.  Similar issues exist for physical keying devices, such as DoD CAC and PIV 
cards because their authentication data is static, and could thus be intercepted in transit, bypassing the 
need to authenticate to their embedded credentialing.   
 
3.2.1.2 Protective Tunneling of Data in Transit 
Without straying into a lengthy discussion of the ultimate ineffectiveness of existing computer 
encryption techniques, it should be taken as historically axiomatic that as computing power increases, 
even the best encryption algorithms eventually get cracked.  Since all data tunneling protocols rely on 
some form of computer based encryption (such as SSL, TLS, and various VPN technologies) it must 
be accepted that, until encryption technology becomes significantly advanced beyond current designs, 
this particular weakness will be an ongoing threat.  Fortunately, the evolution of more sophisticated 
algorithms has effectively mitigated this risk until now.  However, the protocols and underlying 
software engines which are utilized to incorporate encryption into their various protection schemes 
have, themselves, proven to be unnervingly susceptible to attack.  (This particular threat vector is a 
lingering and well-discussed security issue with impact beyond the direct scope of this work.) 
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Many infrastructure analysts believe that this lingering issue for securely moving data between mobile 
device users and the enterprise at the back end is effectively solved by use of VPN technology. With 
the advent of convenient, acceptable-performance mobile VPN technology rapidly cresting the 
horizon, it therefore might appear that satisfactory protection for corporate connectivity is at hand.  
This is a false perception.   
The manner in which all current mobile device operating systems implement network support for VPN 
connectivity has a gaping security hole in it.  This hole is a feature often referred to as ‘split 
tunneling’.  This feature of mobile devices neglects to perform a function deemed essential to the 
default functioning of their larger computer cousins – routing all network traffic to the created VPN 
tunnel unless explicitly instructed otherwise, through overrides to configuration defaults.   In order to 
address this specific problem, enterprise implementers must be able to alter the configured 
functionality of the mobile device OS, until such time as device OS vendors begin incorporating better 
enterprise-level security tools into their systems.  While problematic but conceivable for open source 
systems such as Google’s Android OS, only a cooperative vendor can mitigate this risk with their 
proprietary operating systems, such as Apple, Microsoft, and Research In Motion (RIM). 
3.2.1.3 Misdirection and Brute Force 
Perhaps the conceptually simplest group of protective access models involves both active and passive 
techniques for hiding in plain sight and for manual inspection and validation.  Often clustered together 
under the banners of firewalling and intrusion detection these techniques involve brute-force 
processing of flowing data, occasionally requiring collaboration from endpoint systems and software.  
For instance, while firewalling is largely about restricting the flow of data based on one or more 
elements of network addressing, many network services (such as email, web servers, and VPNs) allow 
the system administrator to modify a key component of addressing – the logical access port.  While 
requiring configurations changes at the enterprise back-end as well as on the users’ endpoint devices, 
this misdirection can be exploited to provide a degree of camouflage to services provided for remote 
access.  In recent years this capability has become ubiquitous and can be found in many home wireless 
technologies.  On the ‘down side’, support for port reassignment on mobile devices is limited to 
individual application-specific implementation. On the ‘up side’, app-level support for port 
reassignment is prominent enough that it remains a useful tool for evolving enterprise environments. 
Strictly the providence of back-end infrastructure, manual inspection and validation of moving data 
presents an interesting conundrum for enterprise security.  While malware and intrusion detection 
systems based on this principle can prove to be extremely effective, they are not only costly, but also 
may be defeated by some of the very-same tools used with the intent of protecting the enterprise.  
After all, you cannot detect and protect against threats you cannot see, and SSL, TLS, VPNs, and other 
encryption-based technologies can prevent brute-force data traffic inspection tools from ever seeing 
the threat.  The thoughtful enterprise administrator may mitigate this failing by employing malware 
and threat detection tools on their deployed desktop, laptop, and server systems, but comparable 
technologies for mobile devices are still in their infancy and provide little, if any, real protection. 
3.2.2 Usage Models 
While there are many variations of usage models for systems and data, when discussing the paradigm 
shift in enterprise security being caused by advances in mobile device technology, only two broad-
brush usage models are pertinent: securely accessing data and securely storing data.  Although valid 
arguments can be made for the use of application-level security models for mildly sensitive data, the 
corresponding overhead involved in providing secondary protections and tracking user-specific access 
contexts quickly becomes unmanageable.  For this reason, these two usage models are discussed as 
systemic models applicable to enterprise security, rather than application level models. Stemming in 
large part from the lack of sufficient security-focused functionality available from mobile device 
operating systems, addressing these two areas of concern is often perceived to be either prohibitively 
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costly or completely out of reach. 
Continuing to avoid straying into a lengthy discussion of the inherent risks in using existing computer 
encryption techniques, it should be duly noted that issues regarding the ultimate failings of modern 
computer encryption implicitly complicates any discussion of how to protect data while in use and at 
rest.  However, modern encryption tools can invariably slow attackers down and should therefore be 
utilized wherever and whenever available. 
3.2.2.1 Data at Rest 
Obviously there is a need to protect valuable enterprise data intended for local storage on a mobile 
device.  Even when available, because not all mobile device operating systems provide native support 
for file encryption, provision for encryption of stored data is generally difficult to access and may 
interfere with application functionality, device performance, and data portability.  Also, when 
implemented, effective enterprise employment of this capability can be impeded by those 
manufacturers desiring to ‘protect the user experience’ by allowing dangerous manual overrides.  
Further compounding the risk, should the security posture of the mobile device operating system 
become compromised, enterprise-sensitive security keys could be revealed to malicious parties. 
Make no mistake, if a device is lost or stolen then the information on it could eventually be seen by 
undesirable viewers.  Only through use of the most current and strongest encryption systems can this 
eventuality be delayed. 
3.2.2.2 Data in Use 
Probably the most serious inherent threat to the enterprise security posture of a mobile device 
operating system that has unfiltered, unprotected access to the internet is that the operating system 
may become unknowingly compromised through ‘drive by’ attacks from websites, side-channel 
exploitations, or malicious attachments to non-enterprise email messages.  Although most mobile 
device operating systems provide a system-enforced isolation between running applications, once the 
OS is compromised this protection is easily circumvented by malware.  Malicious tools such as key-
loggers, screen-grabbers, and memory scrapers are then employed to acquire seemingly protected 
enterprise data.  Thus providing some form of enterprise-level protection to the mobile device 
operating system from internet-based attack becomes a critical element of ensuring protection of data 
in use, a logical association necessitated specifically by the advent of mobile device technology. 
4. ENHANCING PROACTIVE DEFENSE AND EVIDENTIARY DISCOVERY 
In the evolving universe of cyberspace, counterattack is not an option – it is illegal.  This leaves 
mitigation (proactive defense) and forensics (evidentiary discovery) as the primary weapons for 
protecting enterprise security.  Without adequate enabling enterprise-centric tools, effective enterprise 
security is nearly impossible.  Comprehensively unaddressed until recently, strategies and tools for 
effectively protecting the enterprise while enabling seeming unrestricted use of mobile technology is 
finally beginning to emerge.  This section will discuss several of the most promising of these 
advancements and provide practical examples for deployment and use in the enterprise environment.  
Incorporating device-level technologies, back-end control tools and techniques, and supplemental 
enhancing services, these innovations present realistic solutions that are available to the enterprise 
security administrator right now. 
4.1 Device Ownership 
The core principle behind many, sometimes draconian, enterprise security policies is a simple one: “If 
we don’t own it, we can’t trust it”.  Therein lays the riddle… how to take ownership of a user’s mobile 
device without argument, anxiety, and legal malediction?  Although the obvious simple solution is to 
provide a separate enterprise-use device, another viable answer is to manage perceptions so that 
enterprise ‘assimilation’ of a personal device is perceived to be of benefit to the user.  New 
technologies are emerging which allow this assimilation at little or no additional cost to the enterprise, 
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which can provide their users with a variety of services including: 
 Automated secure backup of all device data 
o Including assurance of secure and private handling of personal assets.   
 An unfettered ‘sandbox’ for personal use 
o With less restrictive protections still available from corporate firewalls and 
filters 
 One device supporting personal and business phone numbers 
o Shared number or unique7 
 Access to all the tools and resources they have been begging for 
o Online files, intranet, collaboration tools, search engines, video and 
teleconferencing, etc. 
 Company-paid phone service8 
o Much less expensive than many people think, competitive with existing phone 
systems 
 Eliminate phone-carrier bloat-ware on the phones 
o Only enterprise-vetted apps are allowed in the device’s protected enterprise 
section 
It should be stressed that there already exist practical, cost-effective, secure options for providing these 
benefits to mobile device users who need access to enterprise attachments and resources.  Central to all 
of them is the need to address security limitations imposed by the device operating system.  This is 
why the enterprise must own the device. The cornerstone of any effective mobile device enabled 
enterprise security architecture is the ability to rely on the security posture of the endpoint device.  A 
key component for one such solution is available today for free, courtesy of the NSA.  As of January 
2012, the NSA has made available a Security Enhanced (SE) version of the Android operating system
9
 
for open use, and is planning widespread adoption within the agency itself
10
.  This phone operating 
system even boasts support from a comprehensive security compliance monitoring and management 
tool.  The resulting OS-level improvement in encryption, security policy enforcement, compromise 
detection, and overall device control represents a solution for the problem upon which all other 
significant resolutions depend. 
That was the good news.  The bad news is that, at present, each of the remaining primary non-Android 
device OS providers cannot, or explicitly will not, currently support many or all of these requirements.  
For this reason, the majority of solutions possible today are Android-centric.  Within the remainder of 
this Device Ownership discussion, unless otherwise explicitly noted, the solutions referenced should 
be considered specific to the Android universe for this reason. 
                                                 
7 There are several options including VoIP clients such as Skype and OoVoo, or number consolidation platforms like Ribbit, 
Phonebooth, and GoogleVoice. 
8 Gray, Benjamin; Kane, Christian (2011), “10 Lessons Learned From Early Adopters Of Mobile Device management 
Solutions”, Forrester Research, Inc., Cambridge, MA 
9 Naraine, Ryan (2012), “NSA releases security-enhanced Android OS”, http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/nsa-releases-
security-enhanced-android-os/10108, 29-JAN-2012 
10 Hoover, Nicholas (2012), “National Security Agency Plans Smartphone Adoption”, 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/mobile/232600238, 05-FEB-2012 
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4.1.1.1 Mobile Device Management (MDM) and Mobile Risk Management (MRM) 
The core of any device’s enhanced forensic potential, regardless of OS, will center on the availability 
of more comprehensive monitoring and tracking capabilities both inside the device and at the back 
end.  For this reason available management tools should be closely scrutinized before an enterprise 
decides on which vendor’s product will be selected to provide this capability.   
Although still somewhat lacking in effective security control features, because of various OS 
limitations, several MDM vendors are rumored to already be implementing support for the NSA’s SE 
Android OS
11
.  Until these products begin to appear, one MRM solution provider, Fixmo
12
, already 
offers support for an OS-integrated monitoring and management solution comprehensive enough to 
have been deemed acceptable for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) use with DoD resources.  Among 
this solution’s features are the ability to monitor, track, and control various device characteristics, 
provide enhanced app security controls, sandboxing, FIPS-certified cryptography, control device 
resources (camera, radios, etc.), and handle overall device security policy management, compliance 
monitoring, and control.  This product also provides comparable capabilities, where possible, for 
Apple iOS, and RIM Blackberry as well as integrated features supporting Good Technology secure 
enterprise email apps.  It should be noted that several other vendors, such as 3LM, BoxTone, and 
AirWatch, have voiced plans to improve their support for enterprise security in ways which would 
provide comparable functionality, but in most cases delivery dates have not yet been specified.   
4.1.1.2 Mandatory Boot-Time Captive Tunnel (A Truly Secure VPN) 
Just as MDM/MRM capabilities are at the core of a device’s forensic potential, a ‘mandatory VPN’ is 
at the center of any manageable device protection solution.  The reason for this is straightforward; if 
the device must connect to the enterprise VPN before it can touch the internet, then all of the 
enterprise’s existing investment in network-level infrastructure protections can be brought to bear to 
protect browsing, email, and other network communications without unduly jeopardizing the existing 
enterprise security posture.  In this way the enterprise can also monitor and control access to apps, 
weather through redirection to an enterprise-run ‘app store’, monitoring of installable apps as content, 
or outright blocking of access to non-enterprise app resources.  While this capability is not currently 
supported or allowed by any major cellular carrier, there is a way around them.  This leads us to the 
discussion of the Mobile Virtual Network Operator…  
4.1.1.3 Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) Hosting 
Although possessing a secure device operating system and the management tools to control it are 
critical, they are of no value if the enterprise administrator cannot use them on a device.  Since 
existing cellular carriers currently do not support enterprise customization of the device OS in the 
manner needed to support these needs, a way must be identified for obtaining affordable service for 
enterprise devices which does permit use of an enterprise-customized OS.  This is where the concept 
of an MVNO becomes important, and the distinction for the enterprise between ‘owning’ the MVNO 
and having it ‘hosted’.   
The simplest way to understand what an MVNO is and why it is important would be to think of them 
as a mobile communications carrier who does not actually own any cellular towers.  Instead, an 
MVNO purchases bandwidth from other carriers at a discount and resells it under their own brand.  
Cricket Wireless is an example of an MVNO.  Realizing the potential value of supporting enterprise 
infrastructure with this technology, companies such as CDS Telecommunications of Ashburn 
Virginia
13
 have begun packaging hosted services tailored toward providing this secure architectural 
solution to the market.  By enabling the enterprise itself to act as a cellular service provider with 
                                                 
11 Project website: http://selinuxproject.org/page/SEAndroid  
12 Company website: http://www.fixmo.com/  
13 Corporate website: http://www.CDSTelecom.com  
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competitive rates, the MVNO solution gives the enterprise the ability to lock their mobile operating 
system and device management infrastructure into the ‘subscribing’ device – controlling all aspects of 
data flow, call monitoring, security, and even application availability and installation.  By using a 
hosted source of their MVNO activity, the enterprise gains the advantages of high bandwidth 
utilization from the primary carrier, resulting in lower overall rates for connectivity.  Also, rather than 
needing to customize the Android OS themselves, or purchase MDM/MRM licenses in limited 
volumes, the MVNO host would bear the burden of providing and maintaining the modified OS and 
passing through high volume licensing and sublicensing discounts for the preferred management tools. 
4.2 Application Management 
Having established the preferred infrastructure necessary to support Device Ownership, it is now 
appropriate do discuss a variety of enhanced Application Management capabilities which can allow 
the enterprise to further protect itself from malicious or risky device software (a.k.a. apps) without the 
need for burdensome resource allocations.  By exploiting the various app and resource monitoring 
capabilities made possible through a comprehensive MRM solution, not only does on-device 
enforcement of user and app compliance with enterprise security policies becomes possible, but the 
ability to collect and monitor more comprehensive data for forensic use at the back-end is also 
enhanced.   
4.2.1 Vetting 
The most monumental conundrum accompanying the introduction of mobile device support into any 
enterprise ecosystem is how to establish weather apps abide with the enterprise security posture before 
they are installed and without unduly impeding the user’s access.  With over 400,000 apps available 
directly through Google’s Android Market and over half a million currently available in the Apple 
App Store
14
, and annual growth expected to be counted for both in the hundreds of thousands this year, 
keeping pace with the need to establish the acceptability of desirable apps has already far exceeded the 
reasonable limit for manual inspection.  Further, since an overwhelming number of these apps 
unnecessarily or inappropriately demand access to resources, both on-device and off, that the 
enterprise would rather restrict, the already difficult management task can seem intimidating in its 
vastness.  As luck would have it, there already exist a few time and cost effective solutions for 
mitigating theses difficulties, and many vendors are promising that more are in the works. 
4.2.1.1. Eyes-On  
Although still an imperfect solution, nothing beats eyes-on inspection of source code performed by a 
well-trained vulnerability analyst when evaluating an application for safety and security.  However, 
being somewhat time-consuming and labor intensive, this method of vetting software for enterprise 
use quickly becomes cost-prohibitive for any small enterprise environment.  Even for a large and well-
funded security team, utilizing eyes-on inspection would be viable only for the most highly suspect 
mobile applications whose functionality was deemed essential.  Third party organizations exist, such 
as VeriSign’s iDefense team, which can be contracted to provide some of the industry’s best talent for 
this purpose, but this type of service comes at a high dollar cost and, as such, is likely only to be 
employed by very large enterprises and MVNO Hosting services. 
4.2.1.2 Automation  
The field of apps available for mobile devices is already tremendous and is expanding with increasing 
rapidity.  Only an automated evaluation system can be expected to effectively handle the constant 
onslaught, not to mention the backlog, of available mobile device apps.  An obvious solution, almost 
no effort has been expended in this area to-date.  The key word here is ‘almost’.  In a February 2012 
                                                 
14 Fitchard, Kevin, (2012), “Android development speeds up: Market tops 400,000 apps”, 
http://www.abiresearch.com/press/3799-
Android+Overtakes+Apple+with+44%25+Worldwide+Share+of+Mobile+App+Downloads, 20-JAN-2012 





, CNN reported that Professor Angelos Stavrou of George mason University has designed such 
an automated vetting system for the US Government, and it has already churned through over 200,000 
of the apps in the Android backlog over the past few months.  Kryptowire, a company formed early in 
2011 by Professor Stavrou, is preparing to launch a version of this tool for public use sometime in the 
first half of 2012, as well as some eyes-on vetting services. 
4.2.2 Access Control 
In the world of mobile devices, the term ‘access control’ (AC) has three connotations.  The obvious 
and most common understanding of the term refers to the ability to moderate access to the 
functionality of the device itself, for example - by setting a device password for all activity other than 
answering an incoming call.  Additionally, this term refers to the ability to control the permissions 
which each app installed on the device receives for accessing device resources, such as a camera, local 
storage, radios, and audio I/O resources.  Lastly, AC refers to the ability to regulate the manner in 
which the device and its apps connect with Internet resources.  It is this last area which is most 
problematic when attempting to define a secure enterprise usage model, in part due to previously 
discussed Secure VPN concerns.  In all of these areas, appropriate on-device (in the OS and the apps) 
and back-end logging of historical data is imperative to support enterprise forensic needs. 
4.2.2.1 Logging On 
Perhaps the only area of mobile device security which has been addressed to an adequate degree by 
existing technology regards device-level access controls.  Although there is certainly room for 
improvement, multiple technologies providing user authentication are available which offer features 
including: 
 Remote-controlled access revocation 
 Password retry limits 
 Password complexity 
 Password aging 
 External credentials (CAC/PIV) 
 Check-in timers requiring periodic back-end connection 
to name a few.  In most cases, these solutions provide both on-device and back-end monitoring and 
management capabilities which are even adequate for use in highly sensitive environments. 
4.2.2.2 Device Resources 
Of all the mobile device manufacturers participating in today’s marketplace, Apple stands out as the 
singularly worst prepared for enterprise use when considering the ability to mandate access controls 
from the back-end.  Although a limited degree of control is possible through the use of their access 
policy mechanism, the device user has the ability to ignore policies without detection.  More thorough 
controls are available for the three other major players, RIM (Blackberry), Google (Android), and 
Microsoft (WinMobile).  However, additional controls are still necessary.  For example, the ability for 
an enterprise to require high-level encryption for stored data, restrict or allow specific Bluetooth 
devices, and to control access to the device microphone, camera, and GPS on an app-specific basis is 
only available to a limited degree.  The previously mentioned MDR solution from Fixmo is, arguably, 
the best example of an existing product which addresses this need, pushing available controls to their 
limit regarding each of the four primary device OS manufacturers.  It is also worth noting that in late 
                                                 
15 Milian, Mark (2012), “U.S. government, military to get secure Android phones”, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/03/tech/mobile/government-android-phones/index.html, 03-FEB-2012 
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2012 
 
152 
2011 Dell announced a secure version of its Streak device which was secure enough to be deemed 
acceptable for some uses within the DoD. 
 
4.2.2.3 Network Virtualization Facts and Fallacies  
With regard to access control, the question how to safely provide enterprise users with the ability to 
access the back-end network infrastructure may be the most misunderstood.  Earlier in this work the 
need to ‘own’ the device OS was discussed.  Nowhere is the justification for this requirement clearer 
than with regard to implementing mobile device access strategies for virtual private network 
connectivity.  The defining logic is simple, if an attacker has a path to the OS that does not force data 
to travel through ‘industrial strength’ protection systems then the device’s integrity cannot be 
guaranteed.  If the device’s integrity is in question, then the security provided by the VPN must also be 
suspect.  As described previously, utilizing a MVNO architecture mitigates the problem of device 
trustworthiness.  Without such an architecture, no aspect of VPN authentication from a mobile device 
can be considered safe from compromise. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The introduction of mobile device technology into enterprises creates a multitude of new problems for 
security professionals.  What were once simple voice communication tools are now powerful 
multifaceted devices offering a multitude of ever increasing capabilities with an ever broadening 
spectrum of potential points of compromise.  These new tools have redefined the very framework 
upon which modern work environments are being built.  This metamorphosis has resulted in the 
introduction of powerful technological changes which represent a considerable shift in the overall 
security posture of the mobile phone, a potential nightmare for any organization concerned with 
information security.  In short, the exploding popularity of smartphone technology has greatly 
outpaced the ability of many enterprises to update their security infrastructure.   
Emerging technology is rapidly making its way to market which greatly enhances the enterprise 
security posture and provides data monitoring and collection capability to enhance management 
activity and proactively support potential forensic needs.  Affordable commercial solutions, which 
provide Government and Military grade protections, are emerging in today’s marketplace which 
greatly enhance the ability of businesses, small and large, to achieve an acceptable security posture 
supporting integrated use of mobile device resources. 
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